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IThe role .of the courts in industrial relations 
Sir Jvor Richardson* 
The topic for discussion today is the role of the courts in industrial relations. I begin by 
n1aking an in1111cdiate qualification and by indicating 2 areas on which I wish to focus. The 
qualification is that in referring to the courts, I an1 speaking of the role of the c.:ourts of general 
jurisdiction~ particularly the High Court and Court of Appeal. rather than courts and tribunals 
\Vith specialist responsibilities and notably the Court of Arb:itration and its successors. the 
Industrial Court the Arbitration Court and now~ soon, the Labour Court. The firs:t n1atter I 
propose to explore quite brieny concerns the special features ofindustrial relations \Vhich bear 
on the role of the courts of general jurisdiction in conflict resolution in that fic 'ld. The second i 
to say son1ething about the experience of the Court of Appeal in industrial rehttions questions 
in recent years. 
As we all know, the industrial conciliation and arbitration systen1 pioneered in this country 
has been of profound social and ccono·mic significance. The orig:inal legislation enacted in 
1894 had as its stated purpose (in tern1s of the long title) to encourage the fonnation of 
industrial un·ions and associations and facilitate the settlernent of industrial disputes by 
conciliation and arbitration. The san1e broad goals are reflected ·in the Labour Relations Act. 
1987. even if the language used has a n10r·e familiar contemporary ring.l'he stated purposes of 
that A.ct (again in terms of the long title) are: 
(a) to facilitate the forn1ation of effective and accountable unions and effective and accoun-
table employers organisations 
{b) to provide procedures for the orderly conduct of relations bet\veen \\'Orker and en1-
ployers 
(c) to provide a fran1ework to ,enable agrcen1ents to be reached between \VOrkers and 
en1 players. 
All 3 have an in1portant bearing in considering \Vhat if any part the courts of general 
jurisdiction have to play in industrial relations. 
The .first is directed to the role of unions and e1nployer organisations as agent!) of their 
members. History tells us that in the absence of any organisation there is too great a risk of 
inequality of bargaining po\ver. of exploitation of ·,vorkers. and of dan1agc 'to the social fabric. 
There arc clear social equity considerations and obvious econon1ic in1plications. As \Vell as 
econon1ic survivaL en1ployment often plays a central part in detcnn in ing ·~vvhether individuals 
are able 10 achieve n1any of their aspirations. Equally in1portant for n1any people~ a job is 
closely linked to feelings of self-\\'Orth and dignity. For etnployers loo. and the \Vider good of 
society. the labour market should function fairly and efficiently. The presence of effective and 
accountab'le unions and employer organ.isations .is the first step to that end. 
The second and third stated purposes of the Labour Relations Act arc to provide proce-
dures for the orderly conduct of relations between workers and etnployers and to provide a 
fran1e·work to enable agree.ments to he reached bet\\reen workers and en1ployers. The second 
brings out the crucial point that in the 'Lives of productive enterprises and in the lives of\\'Orke:rs 
alike. the en1ployment of labour needs to be seen as a continu:ing relationship. As in other 
hun1an relationships. there ·will be highs and lows. there will be t ~ensions and hiccups. They 
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have to be resolved in a way that will allow that continuing relationship to endure for the 
cotn n1on good. 
There are 3 reasons \Vhy the courts of general jurisdiction are not well fitted for that kind of 
conflict resolution role. The first is the adversal)' method of conOict resolution which is the 
traditional way in which disputes are resolved in the courts of general jurisdiction. By defin-
ition it focuses on the dispute itself rather than on a continuing relationship: it pits one side 
against the other and there is no built-in encouragement to find common ground, let alone a 
central role for 1nediation and conciliation. The second is that the field of industrial relations 
calls for the developn1ent of broad expertise and experience. Jt requires specialised judges who 
becon1e steeped in the field and who work with those from union and employer ranks who, 
through their own background and experience. have the confidence of their organisations. 
Such tribunals are likely to be n1ore sensitive instrurnents for resolving these disputes. The 
third and associated reason is that the orderly resolution of industrial connict .in an ongoing 
relationship is not si:n1ply a n1atter of applying legal principles and attempting to discover on 
exatnination \vho is right and \\'ho is wrong. Such questions are often not susceptible to that 
kind of cold analysis in a forum far removed fron1 the reality of industrial life and industrial 
strife. Bringing in the law and the regular court processes n1ay sin1ply exacerbate the human 
drarna going on behind an industrial dispute. So .it is that for over 90 years our legislation has 
provided a systen1 ofla\\' designed to settle industrial disputes outside the ordinary courts. Even 
so, there is always scope under the industrial relations legislation to obtain clarification of 
questions of law arising in the specialised court by way of review or appeal and I shall come 
back to that shortly when revie\\'ing the ~experience of the Court of Appeal in the industrial 
relations field . 
It has also al\\'ays been possible for en1ployers or workers to invoke the common law 
through the ordinary courts in son1e circumstances. l''his is a more controversial area. On the 
one hand there is the powerful argument that in a society which sets considerable store by the 
rule of law. no n1e1nbers or sections ofthe comn1unity should be above or beyond the law~ and if 
found to have acted unlawfully they should be answerable through the cou·rts in the ordinary 
way. If unions or etn players can break the law with in1punity simply because they are pursuing 
an industrial goal\ will not others in society in other situations clain1 the same freedom. and 
\vhere will that leave us? On the other hand there is the counter argument that large employers 
\Vith their greater econo:n1ic power are able to shift the industrial balance if they freely invoke 
the costly and ti1ne-consun1ing prooesscs of litigation through the general courts. and may 
even destroy effective unionisn1. 
1' \vo recent cast:s in the Court of Appeal illustrate the problen1. The first i Nl!l!' Zealand 
Baking Trade .. \· En1ployees Industrial Union v Gene~a/ Foods Corporation (NZ) Ltd ( 1985). After a 
conciliated agreen1~, nt was reached~ the union sought to engage in second tier bargaining and 
\\'hen unsuccessful began a strike. The cornpany con1n1enced an action against the union and 
the \vorkers clain1ing injunctions and an associated inquiry into damages. The High Court 
granted intcrirn injunctions restraining unions and workers from strikingorbeingpartytoany 
strike or instigating. aiding or abetting a strike. or being concerned directly or indirectly in 
corn n1itting acts or ornissions in the nature of a strike directed to or in support of a clain1 for an 
increase in ren1uneration during the term of the award. 
A disputes con1 n1 ittee had earlier held against the union which appealed to the Arbitration 
Court.. and when the appeal fron1 the High Court against a grant of the injunctions was argued 
in the Court of AppeaL the hearing in the Arbitration Court was about to con1mence. At that 
Arbitration Court hearing. that Court was to be asked to determine whether the workers had 
the right to strike free of anclions under the Industrial Re'lations Act 1973. By then. too. the 
workers \Vere no longer on trike and accordingly the .injunctions against them were dis-
charged. Then as to the union. all the judg1nents re~ognised the desirability of having indus-
trial la\v disputes detennined in the first instance by the Arbitration Court. However. 4 
men1bers of the Court of Appeal upheld the issuing of the ·injunction against the union for 
it~duc~ng ~ b~e?~h of c~ntract ~ut. nar~owed the order. In the absence of a clear statutory 
dtrectton Inhibiting the tssue of tnJuncttons by the High Court and having regard to earlier 
a..,uthority recogni~ing theirav.ailability. the majority of the judges concluded that the High 
Court had a role tn that field tn that case. 
I took a different vie\\' - na:mely that in the particular circumstances of that case the 
don1inant consideration was that the underlying industrial relations issues could and should 
be determined . first in ~he A~bitration C~urt and the injunction should be discharged. It 
see.med to tne that any 1ntruston by the Htgh ~Court. into industrial relations~ ~even if there is 
jurisdiction. n1ust undermine to some extent the legislative polici~es underlying the Industrial 
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Relations Act 1973.1 added that such injunctions were rare because judges appreciated that the 
grant of an interin1 injunction in industrial n1atters necessarily shifted the balance of advan-
tage without re~olving the underlying issues. That consideration is of course not lin1itcd to the 
industrial relations field. In recent years clain1s for interin1 injun(.:tions in all fi .elds have 
hurgconcd. Regrettably they often involve lengthy hearings followe·d by appeals. Very often the 
Jcl:ision on the interin1 injunction dctennines the practical outcon1c. My own view is that 
~ourts should be reluctant to issue ·interin1 injunctions. especially without notice to the other 
side. and that if there is urgency there ar·e considerable advantages in trying to fix an car'ly 
hearing oft he substantive clai1n rather than to have the n1atter dealt with in that often tactical 
\vay. 
The ne\v Labour Relations Act reserves to the Labour Court full and cxclu ivejurisdiction 
to hear and determine applications for injunctions to slop a strike or lockout or to prevent a 
threatened strike or lockout. In short. that area ofjurisdiction has bc,en shifted fron1 the High 
Court to the Labour Court. 
The second ca!'c is The New Zealand Seantens Industrial Union of J~1orkers v The Nauru Local 
Go\'ernrnent Council ( 1986). As the result of industrial action a vessel called ··Enna G~· owned by 
the Nauru Local Governn1ent C'ouncil was held in the port ofWcli'i ngton for 112 days in 197 J. 
Part \vay through a lengthy hearing in the 1-1 igh ,Court the Sean1cns Union adrnilh~d liability on 
one of the causes of action pleadeJ- that it had induced the Fijian sean1cn on the ·~En naG .. to 
refuse to take the vessel to sea and so to breach their contracts by representing that the union 
" 'Ould obtain for then1 higher \\'ages and better conditions. Darn ages \Vt:re as~essed at $63 568 
\\'ith interest at the rate of 1 ·1 percent per year fron1 23 July '197 3 to the date of judgm,ent. 
eventually entered on 15 Decen1ber 1982. The union failed in its appeal on various datnagcs 
and costs questions, but the specia·l point about the case is that the Nauru Local ·Go\ ernn1ent 
Council succeeded on its cross-appeal and the da1nages \\'ere increased by $142 11 0~ again \Vith 
interest for9 1h years. What ra·ised the dan1ages probJen1 \Vas the finding in the High Court that 
the nev.r shipping service between Auckland and the Islands would have been a financial 
failur·e. and the .. Enna G .. would have been just as costly an investn1ent at sea as it \vas tied up ·in 
port at 'Wellington. The High Court Judge \Vent on to hold that n1oney \'lhich the Nauru Local 
·Governn1ent Council would have spent any\vay without recoupn1ent fron1 profitable trading 
was not r~ecoverable as darn ages. nor could the Counci:l recover general darn ages fort he loss of 
use of the vessel. 
We took a different view. The vessel was to be cn1ployed on this run for a ·tnixture of social 
and econon1ic reasons and \Vith a vie\v to establishing a service hoped to be viable in the long 
tenn. The value of the use of an asset is not necessarily confined lo the in1n1ediate con1n1ercial 
re\vards and in our vie"' a plaintiff is not fairly con1pensated if it receives nothing for being 
deprived of the u e of a vessel beneficial to it. The total award against the Scarnens Union 
including that interest for 9 y~ears to 15 Decen1ber 1982 was over $400 000. and the judgn1cnt 
carried further interest fron1 the date ofjudgn1cnt in the High Court ( 15 Decernber 1982) do\vn 
to the date of actual payn1ent. So it was very expensive industrial action and no doubt will be 
seen as den1onstrating the risks undertaken by unions or en1ployer organisations in pursuing 
industria I solutions. 
A.gain the new Act adopts the n1iddlc course. Jt does not exclude all recourse to la\v- rather 
it confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court to hear proceedings founded on 4 
recognised areas of tort la\\' in \\'hich clain1s have developed in the industrial re\ations field. 
natnely conspiracy. inti111idation. inducctnent of breach of contract. and interference by 
unlawfu'l means \Vith trade. business. or en1ployn1ent (s ~42). 
I turn nO\\' specifically to the second rna ncr I n1entioned earlier. the experience of the Court 
of Appeal in industrial relations cases in recent years. I have gone back 7 years. ·ouring that 
time we have heard 1 S cases \Vhich have coane to the Court on appeal or b) \vay of case stated by 
the Arbitration Court. In thinking about today·s discussion I have reread all the decisions. 
However. rather than try to go through the cases \Vhich \\'Ould in any event be an unprofitable 
exercise. I prefer to n1ake a nun1ber of general points: 
1. Our jurisdiction is largely lin1ited to questions oflaw and in statistical tern1s we allowed 6 
appeals against the Arbitration Court. and disn1issed II Uurisdiction was declined in one 
case). 
2. As tends to happen in other areas oflaw too. it is perhaps n1ore in those ca es which raise 
broad questions of legal policy and principle that appellate courts n1ay not be unani-
nlous. Let me give 2 exarnples. One is Nen' Zealand D~ivers' Association ,, Ne1v Zealand 
Road Carriers ( 1982). A v.'age and price freeze had been in1poscd under the \\'age Freeze 
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Regulation '1982. Two n1onths later a new regulation~ Regulation 5A~ was added which 
pr,;hibited the Arbitration Court during the wage freeze from determining disputes of 
interest or frorn continuing \Vilh proceedings not already concluded. The Drivers Asso-
ciation challenged the regulation as outside the regulation-making powers conferred by 
the Governor General in Council by the Economic Stabilisation Act 1948. Section II 
authorised the rna king of such regulations as appeared to the Governor General "to be 
necessary or expedient for the general purposes of this Act or for giving full effect to the 
provisions of this Act or for the due administration of this Acf·. The Court split 3:2. The 
n1ajority upheld Regulation 5A. It considered it was reasonably capable of being re-
garded as erving the purpose for which the Acl authorised regulations and in particular 
that the Arbitration Court's \VOrk \\'as so central in the ~economy that without major 
interference \Vith that \vork no freeze could have any chance of succeeding. The minority 
concluded that Regulation SA had not added anything at all in terms of economic 
stability since inc rea es in ren1uneration. a widely defined term. were ruled out under the 
existing Regulation 5. The n1inority also considered that when attention was given to the 
long histOJ)' of rt::ady access to the process of arbitration and conciliation as a trusted 
n1eans of enabling open discussion of wage and eJnployn1ent problems~ and so to the 
pro1notion of good industrial relations. there were powerful econon1ic as well as social 
reasons for not shutting down the Arbitration Court in its dispute of interests jurisdic-
tion . 
The other exatnple is North Island Wholesale Groceries Ltd v He»,in ( 1982) where the 
n1anaging director of the 3 Guys Supennarket chain \vas held to have been wrongfully 
distnissed. l 'he tnethod of dis1nissal was ratiJ.er unusual. A l ~etter fro1n Mr Gubay to the 
n1anaging director recorded that the managing director was not the calibr~e of man that 
Gubay \Van ted in the organisation and instructed the n1anaging director to adverti e his 
O\\'n job. The Court had no difficulty in concluding~ as had the High Court that the 
n1anaging director had been \Vrongfully disn1issed and so was entitled to dan1ages. The 
problen1 \Vas over their calculation. He had been contractually entitled to a bonus based 
on the annual profits. The nu1jority he.ld that the cornpensation should be determined on 
the hasis of the gross earnings the employee ·would have received without any adjust-
n1ent for taxation. In doing so~ it departed fron1 the general approach taken by the House 
of Lords in Brirish Transporr Connnission "Gourley ( 1956) for a combination of reasons of 
policy and principle on the one hand and of tax legislation and the difficulties of 
ascertaining a fairly quanlifiable tax burden fairly attribulabl ~e to the lost rcr11uneration 
on the other hand. The tninority Judge concluded that the fundamental principle is that 
dan1ages are con1pensatory and that to ignore tax \\'Ould significantly affect the coin pen-
sa tory nature of the award. 
Thus in both cases there were basic differences bet\veen the approaches of the 
:n1ajority to the legal issue. raising as it did broad questions of legal policy and prin-
ciple. 
3. \Ve take very seriously the direction in (now) s 314 of the new Act and its counterpart in 
earlier legislation that we have regard to the special jurisdiction and powers of the 
Labour Court - the section goes on to refer specifically to the provisions of s 279(4) 
under \Vhich the Labour Court determines n1atters as in equity and good conscience it 
thinks fit: to s 303( 1) under \vhich it111ay accept. adn1it, and call for such evidence as in 
equity and good conscience it thinks fit~ to · 315 providing for the validation of in forn1al 
proceeding : and to s 31 7 conferringvlide procedural po\vers enabling the Labour Court 
... the n1ore effectually to dispose of any n1ath.:r before it according to the sub tantial 
n1erits and equitie of the case ... There are frequent reference in our judgn1ent to the 
special experl'ise o ft he specialised court and the advantages that thal court has overlhe 
Court of Appeal h1 the a sessrnent of industrial relations n1atters. Thus. Sir Thaddeus 
McCarthy. speaking for the Court in 'JVinsrone Clay Products Lirnired v Cartledge(lnspecror 
oj .Awards) ( 1984) "aid: 
His noL to be assumed that propo~ ition s of law. however prestigious and well cstahlishcd in 
the High Cou rl or the Court ofAppeal. will apply with th~ san1c clear force in the Arbitration 
Court. Th tlt is a specialist Court. designed for a specific field . In the rnauers directed by tht: 
statute to con1c before it. it has exclusive jurisdiction. and. when cxcn.:ising it. it rnusttake into 
accounl other considerations besides legal i ·sue . It is concerned prin1arily with fairnc s. 
Thus it has been n1 ore th an once said in this Court thatlt:gal t.ech nicalities or ana logy of rules 
wiJl not c:llways be helpful in achieving the objects of a Court which has been given what 
Cooke J charactc ri cd a~ .. unusual powers ... 
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Perhaps of equal significance is the tendency. if we take a different vieY.'Ofthc legal point .. 
to refer appeals back to the Arbitration Court for reconsideration by that Court rather 
than for the Court of Appeal to rnakc its OYln findings. The other point that has b~cn 
given son1e cn1phasis in our thinking is that the power oft he Arbitration Court. now the 
Labour Court. under s 303( J ). to .. call Cor·· such evidence as that ("ou rt thinks fit differen-
tiates that Court frotn other courts by ernphasising ils supervisory role in the industrial 
rcla t ions lield. 
4. The cautious approach to industrial relations on the part of the Court of Appeal is 
reflected in the decision in Q.ualiry Pizzas Ltd v Canterbury Hotel Ernployees Union ( 1983). 
The High Court had issued a writ of sequestration against the property of the con1pany 
for disregarding an orderofthcArbitration ~Court to supply the union with a list ofnatnes 
of n1ernbers of ·the con1pany's staff covered by the award. Four chartered accountant 
were appointed as sequestra tors of the cornpany which n1anufacturcd pizzas and had 3 
retail outlets. We rejected the various argun1ents n1ade against the existence of a juris-
diction in the High Court to ordering sequestration but concluded that a 'fine was a n1ore 
appropriate ren1edy foreshadowing. as we put it "'the che·erJess prospect of further 
money sanctions. perhaps increasing at a specified an1ount per day while the conten1pt 
ren1ains u npurged'" (p. 618). The judgrnent also noted that sequestration ·which is both 
drastic and blunt in its operation n1ay have devastating consequences on innocent third 
parties as it would have had on the en1ployees of Quality Pizzas \Vho would have had to 
be disn1issed if the sequestration had continued in its si rnple custodial forn1. We post-
poned the decision as to the appropriate level of the fine to give lhe con1pany further tin1e 
to consider its position. As it happened., Coli owing the judgn1cnt the con1pany repented. 
deliv,ered a list of nan1es of en1ploy·ees and \\'as fined. 
5. A nutnber of disn1issal cases have con1e on appeal. In Auckland City Council and 
Hennessy ( 1982) \\'e held .. as had the Arbitration Court that the \\'Ord ··unjustifiably'" 
could not be confined to matters of legal justification for the actual disn1issal: it also 
applied to the process followed by the employer. So an en1ployercarryingout an inquiry 
preceding a resignation or disn1issal n1ust do so in a fair and reasonable n1anner. 
Then in Marlborough Harbour Board v Goulden ( 1985) the Court suggested. without 
deciding, that a similar implication n1ight quite readily be found in private contracts of 
ernployment not subject to the 1973 Act This was for th,e reason as stated in the 
judgn1ent: .. Fair and reasonable treatment is so generally expected today of any en1-
ployer that the la\\f may coine to recognise it as an ordinary obligation in a contract of 
service'". Principles ofnaturaljustice and fairness have an in1n1ediate public appeal. The 
practical difficulty is that as ·in so n1any ar~eas the courts could benefit fron1 expert advice 
as to the social and econon1ic costs and benefits of a change of the kind foreshado\ved. 
but the adversary p~ocess is not an ideal vehicle for conducting an extensive social 
inquiry and there is difficulty in ensuring that the relevant ·rnaterial is actually before the 
Court and adequately tested. 
6. All in all. my impression is that the Court of Appeal has had a distinctly li1nited innuence 
on the interpretation and application of industrial relations legislation. That1nay reOect 
a particularly cautious approach on the part of the Court or. as son1e n1ight say, an 
unwillingness to respond to social change in this area. lt n1ay suggest that the specialist 
court arrangements are working particularly \veil. In any event it seetns consonant \Vith 
the. sch·erne and policy of the legislation that a court functioning as an appellate and 
rev1ew body on matters of law only should have a low. non-activist profile. 
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